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Animal rights activists are currently filing lawsuits naming animals
as plaintiffs hoping that courts will grant animals legal personhood status
and standing to file lawsuits on their own behalf. Currently, animals are
designated as property in the United States. If courts grant animals legal
personhood status, animals would no longer be classified as property, but
instead would hold the same legal rights as humans.
Several courts have grappled with the issue of granting animals
standing to file lawsuits, and--other than a Ninth Circuit decision that
was later explicitly dismissed as dicta by the same circuit-all have de-
clined to do so. Congress has likewise chosen not to grant animals legal
rights. Additionally, although there are numerous statutory protections
afforded to animals, these safeguards fall short of granting animals com-
plete personhood rights.
This Comment will examine animals' historical classification as
property and the standing doctrine as it relates to animals, arguing that
the common law's treatment of animals should not change. Numerous
negative consequences will result from granting animals standing to file
lawsuits. Animals should not have rights, and adapting and expanding
the existing legal protection afforded to animals can better protect animal
welfare. A guardianship model could be implemented to expand stand-
ing and enable humans to file suit on behalf of animals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An animal is not a person. An animal cannot walk into a court-
house, pay a fee, and file a complaint that the animal prepared by and for
itself.1 Despite this seemingly obvious and mundane observation, the
Nonhuman Rights Project ("NRP"), along with several other animal
1. While some humans also cannot physically walk into a courthouse, afford a
filing fee, or possess the necessary education to prepare a complaint, this example is used
to convey animals' complete lack of ability to participate in any portion of their potential
lawsuit.
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rights organizations, believe that an animal should be allowed to file a
lawsuit on its own behalf.
2
Before exploring animals' treatment under the law, it is important to
note that a philosophical difference exists between animal rights activists
and animal welfare activists.3 Animal welfare activists believe that ani-
mals should be treated humanely, with respect and dignity.4 In contrast,
animal rights activists believe that animals possess inherent, legal rights
that are equal to humans' legal rights.5 Animal rights activists reject the
notion that animals can be owned or used, and, most importantly, animal
rights activists do not believe that animals should ever be treated as
property.6
The NRP is an organization composed of animal rights activists
who seek to obtain legal personhood status for animals.7 Legal person-
hood status8 would provide animals with fundamental rights that are
equal to humans' fundamental rights.9 Although the NRP publicly states
that only some animals should be granted legal personhood status,10 that
claim may not accurately depict the activists' true ideological goals.'1
Steven Wise, the NRP's President, admits that he intends to pursue legal
personhood for all animals that have the capacity to suffer.1"
In an effort to gain public and judicial acceptance, Wise began by
seeking rights for chimpanzees, and he intends to extend his pursuit to
2. About the Project, NRP, http://www.nonhumanrights project.org/about-the-
project-2/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). The NRP is an animal rights organization that is
attempting to use channels of the common law to change the status of animals to persons
under the law. Id.
3. Megan A. Senatori, The Second Revolution: the Diverging Paths of Animal Ac-
tivism and Environmental Law, 8 WIs. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 40 (2002).
4. WESLEY J. SMITH, A RAT IS A PIG IS A DOG IS A Boy: THE HUMAN COST OF THE
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 15 (2012).
5. Id. at 16.
6. Id.
7. About the Project, supra note 2.
8. Animal rights activists do not agree on what the definition is for the "legal per-
sonhood" they so desperately seek. Id. A broad version would attribute to animals all
rights that humans possess, and a narrow version would only allow standing to file a law-
suit.Taimie L. Bryant, Living on the Edge: the Margins of Legal Personhood: Sacrificing
the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status ofAnimals as Proper-
ty, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 247, 253-54 (2008).
9. Why We Work Through the Common Law, NRP,
http://www.nonhumanrightsproj ect.org/why-we-work-through-the-common-law/(last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2014).
10. Id.
11. STEVEN M. WISE, DRAwING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL
RIGHTS 34 (2002).
12. Id. If Wise's vision is realized, countless animals would be granted legal per-
sonhood, as even an animal as simple as a goldfish has the capacity to suffer. See infra
note 139.
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the entire animal kingdom.13 Wise fears that moving too quickly in ad-
vocating for animal personhood status will result in backlash.1 4 Conse-
quently, Wise advocates for modest steps, comparing his plan of action
to President Lincoln's "minimum anti-slavery position."15  Wise fur-
thered his analogy to President Lincoln's anti-slavery movement when
he compared a chimpanzee's detention to human slavery before three
New York Supreme Court Appellate Division Justices in October 2014,
and at least one justice was deeply troubled by this analogy.16
Wise is currently advocating for four chimpanzees in New York.
17
Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo are four privately owned chimpanzees
that are at the center of three lawsuits in New York. 18 Tommy is owned
by a private citizen,9 Kiko lives at a primate sanctuary,20 and Hercules
and Leo are owned by the New Iberia Research Center.21 In three sepa-
rate lawsuits, Wise and the NRP demanded that the New York Supreme
Court issue a writ of habeas corpus
22 on behalf of the four animals.23
13. Id. at 240.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 235. President Lincoln's strategy was to always take the smallest possi-
ble step in his fight against slavery to reduce backlash from the public. Id. Wise prefers
this analogy because he believes that an animal's status as property is akin to slavery. Id
at 11-17. Wise is not the only animal rights activist to unsympathetically compare ani-
mals' present property classification to African Americans' exploitation and enslavement.
ASSOCIATED PRESS, PETA Rethinks Slavery Analogy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005,
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/14/nation/na-peta.
16. Judges Voice Doubt at Landmark Trial to Give Chimps 'Human 'Rights, DAILY
MAIL ONLINE, http://www.dailymail .co.uk/wires/reuters/article-2785653/NY-court-
questions-lawyers-novel-bid-win-rights-chimps.html ( ast visited Nov. 12, 2014). The
Justice suggested that Wise instead focus his attentions towards lawmakers and encour-
age them to protect chimpanzees from unlawful detention by private owners. Id.
17. Legal Whac-a-Mole, NRP (Jan. 3, 2015), http://
www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/01/03/legal-whac-a-mole/.
18. Update on Appeals for Tommy, Kiko, Hercules and Leo, NRP (June 3, 2014),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject .org/2014/06/03/update-on-appeals-for-tommy-kiko-
hercules-and-leo/.
19. Bios on the Chimpanzees in New York Lawsuits, NRP (Nov. 30, 2013),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013 /11/30/bios-on-the-chimpanzees-in-new-
york-lawsuits/.
20. Id. Hercules and Leo currently reside at a research laboratory at Stony Brook
University. Id.
21. Primates, THE PRIMATE SANCTUARY, http://theprimate sanctu-
ary.com/profile.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). Interestingly, Kiko is deaf and was res-
cued from abuse by the Primate Sanctuary ten years ago when the organization learned
that a deaf chimpanzee was for sale in Ohio. 1d. Kiko suffers from motion sickness as a
result of the abuse inflicted from his previous owners. Id. The Primate Sanctuary pro-
vides Kiko with Dramamine to help relieve his symptoms. Id.
22. A writ of habeas corpus is a method to safeguard humans from imprisonment in
violation of the law. Harrington v. Richter, 131 U.S. 770, 781 (2011). Habeas corpus
translates to "you have the body". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). According
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Recently, all three trial courts ruled against Wise and the NRP, and
three intermediate appellate courts affirmed the lower courts' decisions.24
Although the three appellate courts based their rulings on different
grounds,25 all three were unwilling to grant the chimpanzees standing to
sue.26 Despite this stark defeat, Wise intends to appeal the cases, and he
will continue filing new cases in court until he reaches the outcome that
he desires.27
Wise has already refiled a petition for Hercules and Leo.28 Alt-
hough the Judge, Barbara Jaffe, initially granted Wise's petition for ha-
beas corpus, she modified it the next day to clarify that she was not rec-
ognizing chimpanzees as legal persons.29  Judge Jaffe heard oral
arguments on the case, but she has yet to render a decision.30
This Comment will analyze the animal activist movement hat en-
deavors to grant animals legal personhood status, specifically the activ-
ists' efforts to achieve standing for animals that would allow the animals
to file lawsuits in court.31 Part II will discuss how the common law his-
torically classified and currently classifies animals.32 Part II provides an
overview of the standing requirement for filing lawsuits and will explore
how the law has reacted to attempts by animal rights activists to grant an-
imals standing.33
Part III of this Comment will argue that animals should not be
granted standing to file lawsuits.34 Most courts have refused to grant an-
to a New York appellate court, that "body" is limited to the human body and does not
include animals. NRP Inc., v. Lavery, No.518336, slip op. at 2-3 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4,
2014).
23. Update on Appeals for Tommy, Kiko, Hercules and Leo, NRP (June 3, 2014),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject .org/2014/06/03/update-on-appeals-for-tommy-kiko-
hercules-and-leo/.
24. Legal Whac-a-Mole, supra note 17.
25. Id. The Third Department held that a chimpanzee is not a person, the Fourth
Department held that habeas corpus does not apply when a petitioner seeks to change the
means of confinement rather than the confinement itself, and the Second Department
threw out the appeal, stating that Wise and the NRP lacked the grounds to appeal. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Media Coverage: Hercules and Leo's Court Hearing, NRP (May 29, 2015),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org /2015/05/29/media-coverage-hercules-and-leos-
court-hearing/.
29. Update on Hercules and Leo Order to Show Cause, NRP (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org /2015/04/21/update-on-hercules-and-leo-order-to-
show-cause/.
30. Media Coverage, supra note 28.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part II.B.I.
33. See infra Parts I1.B-C.
34. See infra Part III.
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imals standing to sue,35 and this precedent should remain unaltered. Part
III will also discuss several of the harmful consequences that would re-
sult from granting animals standing to sue.36 Part IV will conclude with
a summation of the issues explored in this Comment.37
II. THE LAW'S CLASSIFICATION OF ANIMALS AS PROPERTY AND AN
OVERVIEW OF STANDING AS IT RELATES TO ANIMALS' "ABILITY"
TO FILE LAWSUITS
A. Modern Law Views Animals as Quasi-Property
Animals are not human beings and therefore are not treated by the
law as such.38 Under the common law, animals are their owners' proper-
ty.39  Courts and lawmakers alike have long recognized that animals
should be treated as property in accordance with the law.40 Humans are
not only granted property rights over their pets,41 but humans also have
dominion over any wild animal subject to42 a person's control.43 In the
law's eyes, animals have monetary value, and therefore they can be
bought, sold, gifted, donated, or bartered for like inanimate objects.
44
1. Some Courts Recognize That Animals Can Be Treated as
Something More Than Property
Although the longstanding recognition that animals are property is
continually reaffirmed,4 5 recently, some courts have categorized certain
animals as "quasi-property', 46 to enable their owners to collect increased
35. See infra Part III.A.
36. See infra Parts III.B-C.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. App. 1981).
39. Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. EN-
VTL. L.J. 531, 534 (1998).
40. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d at 569.
41. Graham v. Notti, 196 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
42. Graves v. Dunlap, 152 P. 523, 651 (Wash. 1915). An animal is subjected to a
person's control when the animal is claimed by a human's "art and power." ld. This is
true even when the animal is not tamed or domesticated, so long as the animal is kept
confined and contained under the person's control. Id.
43. See generally id. (finding that a captured wild animal becomes a person's prop-
erty so long as the animal is confined within that person's control).
44. Christopher D. Seps, Animals Law Evolution: Treating Pets as Persons in Tort
and Custody Disputes, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1339, 1342 (2010).
45. See Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000); see Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003); see Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Wis. 2001).
46. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248,-236 U.S. 215 (1918). The term
"quasi-property" first appeared in Justice Pitney's opinion. Id. Although Justice Pitney
[Vol. 120:2
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damages in court cases.47 Additionally, some courts have gone further
by finding that pets inhabit "a special place somewhere in between a per-
son and a piece of personal property" to permit pet owners to claim spe-
cial value for their animals in order to seek increased damages when their
pets are harmed.48 Furthermore, several courts have allowed emotional
distress claims when an animal is tortiously injured or killed.49
In addition to classifying animals as quasi-property to allow their
owners to collect increased damages, many states grant certain limited
legal protections to animals that more closely resemble the legal protec-
tions granted to humans. In some states, animals can be designated as
the beneficiaries of trusts,5 ° though the methods for doing so vary widely
from state to state.51 Animal cruelty statutes further exemplify animals'
enhanced protection under the law as compared to inanimate forms of
property.52 Although the increased protection that animals enjoy in many
states may give the appearance that animals are no longer strictly classi-
fied as property, a closer examination reveals that animals' status and
apparent legal rights have striking limitations.
2. States that Recognize Animals as More Than Property Still Limit
Animals' Legal Protections
In a variety of areas, animals' legal protection is not as comprehen-
sive as it first appears. For example, although creating trusts for animals
intended for this term to be limited to the facts of the case in which it was first uttered,
Justice Pitney's intended narrow definition has largely been ignored. Shyamkrishna Bal-
ganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1891
(2012). Instead, the term quasi-property has come to represent he concept that some sit-
uations exist where law recognizes property-like entitlements, while simultaneously un-
derstanding them to be more than mere property. Id. at 1890-91.
47. Seps, supra note 44, at 1344-46.
48. Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1979).
49. Kelch, supra note 39, at 538.
50. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1 (LexisNexis 2014); 760 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/15.2 (LexisNexis 2014) (setting guidelines for establishing a trust for a
domestic or pet animal); Seps, supra note 44, at 1342-43. In 2007, hotel heiress Leona
Helmsley left $12 million to care for her pet Maltese, Trouble, upon Helmsley's death.
Leona Helmsley's Little Rich Dog Trouble Dies in Luxury, ABC NEWS (June 10, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/leona-helmsleys-dog-trouble-richest-world-dies-
12/story?id=13810168. A judge reduced this amount to $2 million. Id. The inheritance
provided for the dog's food, grooming, guardian, and full time security detail. Id.
51. See generally Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Hu-
mans Die?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 617 (2000).
52. Anti-Cruelty: Related Statutes, Animal Legal & Historical Center, MICHIGAN
STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/topicstatutes/sttoac.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
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is protected by statute, judges have the ability to reduce the amount of
money left for the animal if the trust's amount substantially exceeds its
intended use.3 While an animal's welfare undoubtedly benefits from a
trust, the exact benefit the animal receives is ultimately left to the court's
discretion.
5 4
Estate law is not the only area where animals' legal protection is
more limited than it first appears. Surprisingly, animal cruelty statutes
do not contain language that recognizes animals as beings that possess
rights, but rather as "beings toward which humans have responsibili-
ties."55 These narrowly construed statutes exemplify the legislatures' re-
luctance to grant animals unlimited rights. 6 Furthermore, some courts
have held that humans cannot claim large damages for tortiously killed
or injured animals, which reiterates the limitations already imposed by
legislatures.7 Although some courts have been willing to extend animal
protection into the realm of quasi-property, the expansion is not uniform
in all states, and the protections offered are far from absolute.8
53. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15.2(b)(5); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907(c)(6) (Lex-
isNexis 2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-2907(c)(6)(LexisNexis 2014).
54. IN ILLINOIS'S, ALASKA'S, AND ARKANSAS' PET TRUST
STATUTES, AN ANIMAL HAS GREATER PROTECTION IN A TRUST THAN IN A WILL, WHERE THE
TESTATOR ONLY DETERMINES WHO WILL CARE FOR HIS OR HER PET, BECAUSE THE MONEY
FOLLOWS THE PET REGARDLESS OF WHOM ULTIMATELY CARES FOR THE ANIMAL. 760 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/15.2(B)(6); Alaska Stat. § 13.12.907(c)(7); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-
2907(c)(7). THIS PROVIDES GREATER PROTECTION FOR THE ANIMAL BECAUSE IF THE PERSON
WHO THE TESTATOR SELECTED TO CARE FOR HIS OR HER ANIMAL IS UNAVAILABLE (OR IF THE
TESTATOR NEVER SELECTED A CAREGIVER), THE COURT WILL APPOINT A QUALIFIED CARE-
GIVER FOR THE ANIMAL. ID. DESPITE THIS PROTECTION, UNDER ALL THREE STATUTES THE
ANIMAL WILL ONLY RECEIVE THE AMOUNT OF THE FUNDS THE COURT DEEMS "NECESSARY"
TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF THE TRUST. 760 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/15.2(b)(5); Alaska Stat. §
13.12.907(c)(6); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-2907(c)(6). IN THE CASE OF LEONA HELMSLEY'S
DOG, THE JUDGE REDUCED THE DOG'S INHERITANCE BY $10 MILLION. SEE SUPRA NOTE 50.
55. David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Ani-
mals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 747, 763 (1995).
56. Id. at 14.
57. See Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000); Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003); Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Wis. 2001).
58. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15.2(b)(5); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907(c)(6); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 14-2907(c)(6). Although these statutes offer protection to an animal after
the death of its owner, the legislation falls short of absolute protection for the animals.
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15.2(b)(5); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907(c)(6); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2907(c)(6).
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B. An Overview of Standing
The standing requirement59 is a concept derived directly from Arti-
60cle III of the Constitution. While there are several justifications for
stringent standing requirements, the most important6l was articulated and
reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Summers v. Earth Island Insti-
tute.62 There, the Court stated that standing promotes the separation of
powers by limiting the judicial branch to its proper role.63
Standing to file a lawsuit requires three elements: (1) the person fil-
ing suit must have suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there must be a causal
connection between the alleged injury and the conduct in question; and
(3) the alleged injury must be likely to be capable of redress by a judicial
remedy.64 The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate that
he or she has met each element of the standing requirement.65 Although
the absence of an injury-in-fact does not automatically eliminate a third
party from filing a lawsuit on the injured party's behalf, lacking an injury
makes it "substantially more difficult" to meet Article III's require-
66ments.
Because animals are largely considered property in the law's eyes,
animals do not have interests that are protected by the law.67 Although
federal statutes protect animals from maltreatment, animal rights activists
face great difficulty when they attempt to enforce these statutes.68 Courts
are reluctant to grant animal rights activists standing to file suit on an an-
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52
(1984). Although Article III of the Constitution does not specifically set forth standing
requirements, the modem Supreme Court has interpreted and explained the standing doc-
trine. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to "Accidental" Plaintiffs: Les-
sons From Environmental ndAnimal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REv. 1, 3 (2010).
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
61. Pushaw, supra note 59, at 3. Other justifications include increasing the quality
of judicial decisions by guaranteeing that the parties involved in the case have more than
a mere intellectual or ideological interest in the outcome of the case and promoting judi-
cial efficiency by ensuring that limited resources are devoted to the most important cases.
Id.
62. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009).
63. Id.
64. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see Kelch, supra
note 39, at 535.
65. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
66. Id. at 562 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).
67. Kelch, supra note 39, at 535.
68. Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardian-
ship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 513, 515
(2007).
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imal's behalf because it is difficult for humans to fully satisfy the injury-
in-fact requirement as a third party for an animal plaintiff.
69
The standing doctrine presents animal rights activists with a nearly
insurmountable challenge in their goal to have courts award rights to an-
imals.7° Many animal rights activists would solve the standing dilem-
ma71 by granting animals legal personhood status.72 Legal personhood
status would enable the animal to have the necessary standing to file a
lawsuit on its own behalf.73 Despite animal rights activists' zealous cru-
sade, the legislature and the judiciary are reluctant to radically transform
the legal system by granting animals the legal personhood status that
would enable them to file lawsuits.
C. Animals Have Not Been Consistently Granted Standing By Courts or
the Legislature
1. State Animal Welfare Statutes Do Not Grant Animals Standing
To File Lawsuits
State animal welfare statutes protect animals from wantonly cruel
and malicious treatment.74 Despite the protection afforded to animals
under these statutes, animals' ecurity and welfare often rests on the po-
75sition that animals are property. Therefore, the monetary penalties as-
signed for violating the cruelty statutes reflect the animals' status as
property.76
Furthermore, animal welfare is continually disregarded when that
welfare conflicts with humans' rights. For example, in Alabama, the
same provision that protects animals from inhumane treatment also pro-
vides a defense for "destroying" an animal that trespasses onto growing
crops.77 Many states view farming, fishing, and hunting as valuable to
69. Id.
70. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 773.
71. Id. at 773-75.
72. Q&A About the NRP, NRP, http://www.nonhumanrights project.org/qa-about-
the-nonhuman-rights-project/ (last visited, Nov. 8, 2014).
73. About the Project, supra note 2.
74. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511 (2014); ALA. CODE § 3-1-10 (2014).
75. Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. App. 1981).
76. ALA. CODE § 3-1-10 (2014).
77. Id. Similarly, other state statutes value one animal's life over another. In Ok-
lahoma, service animals are protected from willful harm, and a violation of this provision
can result in imprisonment. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 649.3 (LexisNexis 2013). The
law assigns different protection to different animals, indicating that services animals and
livestock should be afforded greater protection than "regular" cats or dogs. Id. Further-
[Vol. 120:2
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humanity, and likewise exempt these activities from prosecution under
animal cruelty statutes.78 In some states, these statutes go as far as re-
quiring a cat or dog owner to pay a livestock owner for all damages the
cat or dog caused to the livestock, even if the livestock owner ultimately
killed that cat or dog.79 Most importantly, although these statutes afford
limited protection for animals, none of these statutes include provisions
that grant animals standing to file a lawsuit on their own behalf.
2. Congress Has Not Granted Animals Standing to File Lawsuits
Animal rights statutes were not passed with the sole purpose of pro-
tecting animals.80 The federal legislature passed the Endangered Species
Act8' ("ESA") and the Marine Mammal Protection Act 82 ("MMPA") to
help avoid the extinction of animal species because the absence of cer-
tain animal species would disadvantage mankind.83 These two acts' leg-
islative histories further reveal that Congress did not intend for the ani-
mals protected under either act to have rights themselves, but rather
recognized that certain animals have specific value to humans.84 Alt-
hough these statutes were passed with the goal of maintaining diversity
among nature, both statutes place humans' needs above animals' needs.85
Neither statute provides animals with any enforceable claim against hu-
86mans or the government.
Likewise, Congress stated that animals should be protected because
they are potential resources, and "it is in the best interest of mankind to
minimize the losses of genetic variations.87 Additionally, neither the
ESA nor the MMPA contain any language that would be consistent with
a concern for animal safety, harm, or welfare.88 Under both statutes, an-
imals are protected purely for the resulting benefit to humans.
more, in Iowa, the animal abuse statute allows for destroying an unconfined animal that is
causing damage to property. IOWA CODE § 717B.2(9) (2013).
78. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 41(LexisNexis 2013); Schmahmann & Polacheck,
supra note 55, at 762.
79. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 41 (b)(LexisNexis 2013).
80. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 769.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2)(2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
84. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 768-69.
85. Id. at 769. Both the ESA and the MMP protect animals for their potential bene-
fit to mankind in the future, not for the sake of the animals' health or wellbeing. Id. at
768-69.
86. Id. at 768.
87. H.R. REP. No. 93-412 (1973), as quoted in Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828
F. Supp. 102, 105 (D. Mass. 1993).
88. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 769.
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Although the Animal Welfare Act 89 ("AWA") protects countless an-
imals from harm and abuse, the AWA also explicitly provides for the
regulation and use of animals in research.90 Furthermore, the AWA
plainly permits animal suffering for necessary research, as long as this
suffering is minimized.91 Much like state animal cruelty statutes, the
ESA, the MMPA, and the AWA were never intended to place animal
welfare on equal footing with human rights.92 Consequently, the AWA
contains no language that explicitly grants animals standing to file law-
suits by claiming a violation of the Act.93 Because the ESA, the MMPA,
and the AWA were passed with human interests in mind, animal rights
activists have been largely unsuccessful in filing lawsuits under these
statutes.
94
3. State Courts Are Reluctant to Broadly Interpret Animal Cruelty
Statutes, Even When the Issue of Standing Is Not Raised
One area where courts have narrowly interpreted the afforded pro-
tection in animal cruelty statutes is the scientific research field. Alt-
hough some state legislatures have explicitly exempted scientific re-
search from generic animal cruelty statutes,95 courts in other states have
read this exemption into generally worded animal cruelty statutes.96 In
New Jersey Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Ed-
ucation,97 the court found that activities with educational and scientific
purposes, such as research for a high school science fair, possessed "re-
deeming qualities," and therefore would not be classified as wantonly
cruel acts under the state's animal cruelty statute.98 Courts' interpreta-
tions of state animal cruelty statutes demonstrate that courts often refuse
to place animals' welfare above human needs and scientific progress, and
89. 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2012).
90. 7U.S.C.§2131.
91. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(1) (2012). This section of the statute goes on to state that
tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, and euthanasia can be withheld when "scientifically
necessary." 7 U.S.C. § 2134(a)(3)(c)(v) (2012).
92. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 761.
93. See 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
94. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 767.
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1650 (2014)(noting that public health and wel-
fare require the use of animals for the advancement of science, although the statute does
mandate that these animals should be treated humanely).
96. N.J. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bd. of Educ., 219 A.2d 200,
208 (N.J. Cnty. Ct. 1966).
97. N.J. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bd. of Educ., 219 A.2d 200,
208 (N.J. Cnty. Ct. 1966).
98. Id. at 208-09.
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importantly, none of the abovementioned statutes contain explicit provi-
sions granting animals standing.
4. Federal Courts Are Reluctant to Enforce Legislation When
Animals Are Named as Plaintiffs
In federal legislation such as the ESA, specific statutory provisions
allow for private citizens to file lawsuits based on ESA violations in a
"citizen suit."99 Despite this seemingly straightforward statutory permis-
sion to file lawsuits on an animal's behalf, citizens have still been denied
standing to do so.'00 Courts often express that humans have difficulty
meeting standing's injury-in-fact requirement in citizen suits.101 Animal
rights activists hail two recent court cases as triumphs for the animal per-
sonhood movement.10 2 While at first glance these cases seem to be mas-
sive victories for animal rights activists, both cases are shallow successes
at best.
In Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources,10 3 the
Ninth Circuit appeared to grant a bird legal status to file suit under the
ESA,10 4 and in Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan,°5 the Ninth
Circuit allowed a lawsuit under the ESA on a squirrel's behalf.106 Nei-
ther case specifically addressed the standing issue, presumably because
the issue was not raised.10 7 In Mount Graham Squirrel, animal rights ac-
tivists filed the claim under no pretense that a squirrel was filing the
suit.10 8 In Palila, the Ninth Circuit stated that a finch-billed bird had le-
gal standing to file a lawsuit, yet the court provided no justification for
its departure from precedent.'
0 9
99. 16 U.S.C § 1540(g)(2012).
100. See Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New England Aquari-
um, 836 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D. Mass. 1993). Contra Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d
1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).
101. Hogan, supra note 68, at 515. Hogan suggests that even if plaintiffs were able
to satisfy standing's injury-in-fact requirement, many claims would still fail under the
"zone of interests" test, which aims at ensuring that the challenges to a statute further,
rather than frustrate, the goals of the statute. Id. at 521.
102. See generally Palila v. Hawaii Dep't. of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 2004); Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir.
1992).
103. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1992).
104. Id. at 496. The court's statement that the bird was granted standing was later
explicitly found to be mere dicta by the same circuit. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179.
105. Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
106. Id. at 1448.
107. See generally Palila, 639 F.2d 495; Mount Graham, 954 F.2d 1441.
108. Mount Graham, 954 F.2d at 1448.
109. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107.
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Despite these two successes for animal rights activists, the Ninth
Circuit's most recent decision on this issue had the opposite outcome. In
Cetacean Community v. Bush," 0 the Ninth Circuit dismissed an attempt
by the entire population of the world's whales, dolphins, and porpoises to
bring a claim in federal court.Il' The Ninth Circuit held that the state-
ments in Palila about standing were "nonbinding dicta," and that the
bird's standing was never at issue in that case.1 2 The court determined
that the Palila court's statement that the bird "wing[ed] its way into fed-
eral court as a plaintiff in its own right," was unnecessary and little more
than "rhetorical flourishes."'
' 13
The Ninth Circuit further examined the standing issue in Cetacean
Community. The court noted that it is "obvious that an animal cannot
function as plaintiff in the same manner as a juridically competent hu-
man being."' 1 4 The Ninth Circuit stated that Congress may pass legisla-
tion that authorizes an animal to sue on its own behalf, but after analyz-
ing the ESA, the MMPA, and the National Environmental Policy Act,'
the Ninth Circuit determined that Congress has not yet granted animals
the ability to sue in their own name.'16 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the First Circuit, stating that if Congress and the President
desire to take the "extraordinary" step of permitting animals to file a law-
suit, they should do so explicitly and clearly.1 '
In addition to Mt. Graham Red Squirrel, Palila, and Cetacean
Community, two additional courts have refused to grant animals standing
to file lawsuits under the MMPA and the ESA. In Citizens to End Ani-
mal Suffering & Exploitation v. New England Aquarium,118 the court held
that the MMPA does not authorize suits to be brought on animals' be-
half."9 The court refused to permit an animal standing to file a lawsuit
110. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1173.
113. Id. at 1773-74.
114. Id. at 1775.
115. National Environmental Poliy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970). The National Environmental Policy Act was created with the purpose of creating
a national policy to encourage harmony between humans and the environment. Id. The
Ninth Circuit included this Act with the ESA and MMPA when searching for any evi-
dence that Congress intended animals to have standing to sue.
116. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1169, 1176, 1179.
117. Id. at 1179 (quoting Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New
England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993)). In New England Aquarium,
the First Circuit dismissed an action filed by animal rights activists and a dolphin alleging
a violation of the MMPA. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 49-50.
118. Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New England Aquarium,
836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993).
119. Id. at49.
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in the absence of a clear statutory statement.120 Similarly, in Hawaiian
Crow v. Lujan,'21 the court found that the ESA authorized suits brought
by any person.122 Animal rights activists had attempted to name a spe-
cies of bird as plaintiff, and the court ordered the bird's name to be re-
moved from the complaint.123 The standing doctrine has consistently
proven to be the largest impediment facing animal rights activists.1
2 4
5. International Courts Have Not Granted Animals Standing to File
Lawsuits
Although court decisions from other nations may not directly im-
pact legal judgments in the United States, evaluating trends and verdicts
from abroad can provide insight into legal issues at home. Recently, a
court in Argentina was presented with a habeas corpus petition on an
orangutan's behalf.25 The decision was inaccurately reported in the me-
dia as having granted basic legal rights to the orangutan.126 Even though
Wise and the NRP initially applauded the Argentine decision,27 upon
closer review they realized, and admitted, that the opinion did not grant
animals the rights that the media had initially purported.1 21 In actuality,
the case was simply remanded to a different court that lacks the power to
issue writs of habeas corpus, and that court will view the case through an
animal cruelty lens.'29 Furthermore, it is likely that the opinion's animal
rights language was merely dicta.130 Accordingly, animal rights activists
will have difficulty using the Argentine case to further their quest to
grant animals legal personhood status.
120. Id.
121. Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 551-552 (D. Haw. 1991).
122. Id. at 551.
123. Id. at 552.
124. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 773.




128. Id. Wise himself stated that the translated version of the Argentine decision
contains none of the quotations or language that were reported by media. Id. Wise and
the Nonhuman Rights Department can only benefit from a court, even in another country,
ruling that animals have rights, yet he was willing to admit that this decision did not ap-
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III. COURTS AND LEGISLATURES SHOULD NOT GRANT ANIMALS
STANDING TO FILE LAWSUITS
A. The Common Law Treatment ofAnimals Should Not Be Drastically
Altered By a Rogue Court
The courts and the legislature consistently reiterate that animals do
not have standing to sue.131 Although in Palila the Ninth Circuit granted
a bird the ability to file suit on its own behalf,132 in Cetacean Community,
the same circuit later unequivocally rejected and criticized Palila's dicta
that purported to grant animals standing.133 While there is a third Ninth
Circuit case falling in between Palila and Cetacean Community that al-
lowed a successful ESA claim on a squirrel's behalf, the animal was not
named as a plaintiff, and the standing issue was never raised.134 he ani-
mal rights movement, particularly the animal personhood movement, is a
liberal movement within Western tradition.135 Therefore, if the Ninth
Circuit, a widely regarded liberal circuit,136 refuses to grant animals
standing to file suit, other courts should follow the Ninth Circuit's lead.
Additionally, the current cases in New York provide future courts
with three different precedents to follow. 137 When Wise and the NRP
filed suit on behalf of chimpanzees in New York, the three cases were
filed in different departments, and each court reached a decision on dis-
tinctive grounds.138 Although all three courts denied the petitions for ha-
beas corpus, the most crushing blow' 39 to the animal personhood move-
ment was delivered by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
Division, Third Judicial Department ("Third Judicial Department").
140
131. Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New England Aquarium,
836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1973-74
(9th Cir. 2004); Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Haw. 1991).
132. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 1441 (9th
Cir. 1992)
133. Cetacean Cinty., 386 F.3d at 1973-74.
134. Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1992).
135. ROBERT GARNER, ANIMAL RIGHTS, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LIBERAL TRA-
DITION, 8:1 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 7, 15 (2002).
136. John Schwartz, 'Liberal'Reputation Precedes Ninth Circuit Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/us/25sfiinth.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
137. Legal Whac-a-Mole, supra note 17.
138. Id.
139. Id. One appellate court decided that habeas corpus did not apply in the context
of changing a chimpanzee's confinement from one location to another, and the second
appellate court threw out the appeal. Id. Wise himself admitted that the Third Judicial
Department's decision was the most damaging. Id.
140. NRP Inc., v. Lavery, No.518336, slip op. at 2-3 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2014).
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The Third Judicial Department explicitly declined to declare that animals
are persons, stating "a chimpanzee is not a 'person' entitled to the rights
and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus.141 Importantly,
the court looked to animals' treatment in the history and tradition of the
common law and determined that "animals have never been considered
persons for the purposes of habeas corpus relief, nor have they been ex-
plicitly considered persons or entities capable of asserting rights for the
purpose of state or federal law."142 The Third Judicial Department not
only recognized that animals are not persons in the framework of habeas
corpus relief, but also that animals are not persons capable of possessing
or asserting rights in any legal context.
143
Future courts should find the Third Judicial Department's decision
persuasive when deciding whether to grant animals legal personhood sta-
tus, particularly because the decision clearly addresses and holds that an-
imals cannot possess rights. Furthermore, courts should recognize that
no animal welfare statute currently grants animals standing to sue, 144 and
extensive case law exists where courts have deferred to long-standing
legislative and public policy guidelines maintaining that animals are
property.145  Likewise, courts and legislatures have continually reaf-
firmed that animals do not have standing to sue.146 If state courts, the
Ninth Circuit, and the federal government are unwilling to extend the
standing doctrine to animals, future courts faced with this issue should
also refuse to grant standing to animals. To do otherwise would be a
drastic departure from law and precedent.
B. Significant Negative Consequences Will Result From Granting
Animals Legal Personhood Status
Professor Richard Epstein147 stated that "[t]here would be nothing
left of human society if we treated animals not as property, but as inde-
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 87 and 94 and accompanying text.
145. See Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000); Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003); Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Wis. 2001).
146. Citizens to End Animal Suffering v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45,
49 (D. Mass. 1993); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1973-74 (9th Cir. 2004).
147. Richard Epstein is a law professor at New York University School of Law and
is a noted researcher and scholar who studies, teaches, and writes about property law.
Richard Epstein, NYU LAW, https://its.law.nyu.edu
/facultyprofiles/profile.cfn?section=bio&personlD=26355 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
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pendent holders of rights."'148 In Rabideau v. City of Racine,149 Judge
Bablitch considered whether animals were properly classified as proper-
ty." ° Judge Bablitch reiterated Epstein's concern.'51 Judge Bablitch ex-
pressed his sympathy for humans who form deep bonds and "devoted
friendship[s]" with dogs, and likewise expressed his disdain for classify-
ing dogs as property.52 Despite this sympathy, Judge Bablitch recog-
nized that removing the property classification from dogs would result in
eventually removing the property distinction from all animals. 1
53
Professor Epstein and Judge Bablitch envisioned the chaos that
would result from granting legal rights to animals, and this chaos will
begin if animals are granted standing to sue. Hundreds or even thou-
sands of cases would clog the court dockets if animal rights activists
could file suit with animals as the plaintiffs, with these "plaintiffs" rang-
ing from cattle on farms, to monkeys in laboratories, to domesticated cats
and dogs in households.1 54 Furthermore, courts would be tasked with
handling claims and regulating industries that Congress intended to be
controlled entirely by administrative agencies.
55
Additionally, the chaos caused by granting animals standing to sue
would extend beyond court congestion. The medical research field is
largely dependent on animal testing.156  Although there is admittedly
some excessive and unnecessary testing present in the medical research
industry, using animals in medical research is a conflict that cannot be
avoided. 157 Furthermore, Congress explicitly chose to exempt birds, rats,
and mice that are bred for research from the AWA. 158 Animal rights ac-
tivists argue, however, that human advancement, even when directly re-
lated to human health, can never justify animal suffering. 1
59
148. Richard A. Epstein, The Next Rights Revolution?, 51 NAT'L. REV., 44, 45
(1999).
149. Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Wis. 2001).
150. Id. at 798-89.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 798.
153. Id. at 798-99.
154. Smith, supra note 4, at 69.
155. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 768 (citing Int'l Primate Prot.
League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934, 940 (4th Cir. 1986)). Con-
gress did not intend for courts to be burdened with regulating the industries governed by
the AWA. Id.
156. Smith, supra note 4, at 176-180, 190, 191. For example, animal research has
produced profound results in the treatment of AIDS in addition to enabling drug and toxi-
cology testing. Id.
157. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 755-56.
158. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(g)(1)(2012).
159. Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 55, at 757.
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Similarly, the meat and dairy industries directly depend on humans
consuming animals. Congress actively supports these industries, and the
Agriculture Act 160 provides for an estimated $956 billion to support the
programs protected under the act.'6' The Agriculture Act provides sub-
sidies for crop insurance, rural development, research, and commodi-
ties.162 Interestingly, although the Agriculture Act does not directly sub-
sidize farmers who raise animals for human consumption, estimates
suggest that roughly two-thirds of the budget for subsidizing commodity
crops actually subsidizes crops that are used as animal feed.163 Congress
has explicitly' 64 and implicitly authorized using animals in the medical
165
and meat industries. If Congress grants animals standing to file suit in
court, it will destroy the same industries that it actively supports.
Wise admits that if the animals enabling the medical and meat in-
dustries to flourish are granted rights, the industries will be "severely af-
fected[.]' 166 "Severely affected" is an understatement. How can the
meat and dairy industries continue to function if cows, pigs, and chickens
are permitted to sue their owners for the bodily injury and harm that di-
rectly results from human consumption? If animals are granted legal
personhood status, the medical, meat, and dairy industries will be irrevo-
cably harmed.
C. IfAnimals Are Granted Standing, Where Will it End?
1. Animal Rights Activists Desire to Extend Rights Beyond
"Intelligent" Animals
There is no consensus among animal rights activists as to which an-
imals should be granted standing.167 The NRP suggests a gradual ap-
160. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014).
161. H.R. 2642, Agricultural Act of2014, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (Jan. 28,
2014), http://www.cbo.gov/publication /45049.
162. Id.
163. Arthur Allen, U.S. Touts Fruit and Vegetables While Subsidizing Animals that
Become Meat, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national /health-science/us-touts-fruit-and-vegetables-
while-subsidizing-animals-that-become-meat/2011/08/22/ glQATFG5IL-story.html.
164. 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2012). Congress wanted to ensure "that animals intended for
use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane
care and treatment." Id.
165. Id.
166. Wise, supranote 11, at 11.
167. There is also disagreement among animal rights activists as to what exactly is
meant by "legal rights". Senatori, supra note 3, at 39.
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proach to granting animals legal rights.168 The organization states that
they will begin with animals that exhibit "complex cognitive abilities
such as self-awareness and autonomy."1 69 Intentional behavior, linguistic
ability, 17 emotional capability, and personality traits are additional defin-
ing characteristics suggested as guidance to determine if an animal
should possess legal personhood status.171 Some animal rights activists
reject the notion that there should be a distinction between different ypes
of animals; they say if it is an animal, it should possess the same rights as
humans. 
72
Looking to the NRP, Wise desires to extend legal rights to all ani-
mals with the capacity to suffer.173 Under Wise's definition, almost eve-
ry single animal will be capable of having a lawsuit filed in its name.
For example, a goldfish174 could conceivably bring a claim of false im-
prisonment for being held in a tank in a child's bedroom.
2. Environmental Rights Activists Are Pursuing Similar Goals for
the Environment
Although animal rights activists argue that animals should be grant-
ed legal personhood status and standing to sue based on the animals'
ability to reason, feel pain, and suffer,175 those limitations on expanding
legal personhood may not be in place for long. In 1972, Christopher
Stone176 first 177 articulated the argument that the environment should
possess rights, particularly the standing to file suit on its own behalf.
178
Both movements have since shared similar characteristics and followed
168. Q&A about the NRP, supra note 72.
169. Id. The NRP wants to begin with great apes, dolphins, and elephants, but notes
that these are their only "plaintiffs" for the time being. Id.
170. There is no scientific agreement on what, if any, animals possess linguistic abil-
ities. Kelch, supra note 39, at 23.
171. Seps, supra note 44, at 1354-57.
172. Bryant, supra note 8, at 271.
173. Wise, supra note 11, at 34.
174. See Jackie Nordgreen et al., Thermonociception in fish: Effects of two different
doses of morphine on thermal threshold and post-test behaviour in goldfish (Carassius
auratus), 119 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR SCIENCE, 101, 101 (2009) (finding that gold-
fish are capable of experiencing pain).
175. Seps, supra note 44, at 1354-55.
176. UNIV. OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW, Christopher D.
Stone, http://weblaw.usc.edu/contact/ contactlnfo.cfm?detaillD=372 (last visited Feb. 4,
2015). Christopher Stone is an influential scholar who focuses much of his research on
environmental law and ethics. Id.
177. Senatori, supra note 3, at 35. Similar to animal rights activists, environmental
right activists file lawsuits in court and demand standing for the environment. Id.
178. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 17 (1972).
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common legal strategies. 179 It is no stretch to believe that if animals are
granted standing to sue, trees and lakes will not be far behind.
D. Animal Welfare Should Be Protected by a Guardianship Model
Instead of Granting Animals Legal Personhood Status
Although animal rights activists have thus far had extremely limited
success filing suits under the ESA and MMPA, 180 granting animals
standing to file law suits on their own behalf is not the proper solution
for enabling greater enforcement of these acts. One viable method that
would allow increased enforcement of the ESA and MMPA is to permit
non-profit organizations with a demonstrated dedication to animals and
legal proficiency to serve as a guardian ad litem'81 to file suit under these
acts.'82 This guardianship model is already utilized in Italian law to al-
low environmental groups greater access to the justice system.'83
If courts permit a slight modification of the traditional standing re-
quirement for animal welfare cases, the ESA and MMPA could be en-
forced without granting animals standing to file suit on their own behalf.
If courts broaden the standing requirement in these cases, empathetic
humans with proper legal training could easily file suit for an animal to
protect the animal's welfare.184 A lawsuit filed to protect an animal will
have the same outcome regardless of whether an animal or a nonprofit
organization is the named plaintiff. 85 Even proponents who ardently
support granting animals legal personhood status recognize that the out-
comes will not differ. 186
IV. CONCLUSION
As the three New York appellate courts have demonstrated, animals
do not, and should not, possess the same legal rights as humans. Alt-
hough animals should be treated humanely, there is a stark difference be-
tween promoting animal welfare and advocating for animal rights. Fur-
thermore, as the Third Judicial Department noted, nowhere in Wise's
179. Senatori, supra note 3, at 41.
180. Supra notes 101 and 102.
181. A guardian ad litem is an attorney who is appointed by the court to represent a
minor or incompetent person. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). A guardian ad
litem is charged with pursuing what is in his or her client's best interests. Id.
182. Hogan, supra note 68, at 518.
183. Id. Italian law allows certain, selected environmental organizations to intervene
on environmental matters. Id. at 533.




PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
arguments did Wise purport that Tommy the chimpanzee was mistreated
or desire to improve the animal's welfare.187 Instead, Wise and the NRP
object to the mere idea that animals can be confined and used for man-
kind's own purposes.
188
If Wise were to see his goals realized, the consequences would be
drastic. Any industry that used animals in any way would be affected.
The medical research, meat, dairy, and pet industries would face sweep-
ing and severe changes. Courts would be confronted with congestion
and confusion and would be forced to decide whether a pet parrot could
be confined to a cage. Furthermore, as is already in progress, courts
would ultimately face lawsuits from activists claiming that trees possess
these same rights as well.
The Ninth Circuit and the New York appellate courts correctly rec-
ognized that animals do not have the same rights as people. These courts
accurately acknowledged that the legislature has consciously chosen not
to grant rights to animals. Most importantly, these courts accepted what
mankind has long understood: animals, though worthy of dignity and re-
spect, do not possess, and cannot assert, the same legal rights as humans.
187. NRP Inc., v. Lavery, No.518336, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4,2014).
188. Q&A about the NRP, supra note 72.
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